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GLD-295       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3286 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  HENRY CHRISTOPHER STUBBS, III, 
        Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Prohibition from the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1-10-CV-01849) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
September 27, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 04, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Henry Christopher Stubbs, III, is a Pennsylvania state inmate who petitions the 
Court pro se, seeking a writ of prohibition.  We will deny relief. 
Stubbs filed in the District Court an amended habeas petition on September 2, 
2010, in which he made numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, alleged a 
Brady violation, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and argued that the state 
collateral relief proceedings violated due process.  On August 10, 2012, Stubbs sought to 
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compel the District Court to transfer his habeas petition to this Court for disposition, 
alleging that the District Court had failed to timely render final judgment.
1
 
The writ power of the federal courts is an extraordinary remedy, used to “compel 
[an inferior court] to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.” Kerr v. U.S. Dist. 
Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).
2
  A petitioner seeking relief “must establish that (1) no 
other adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires, (2) the party's right to issuance 
of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the 
circumstances.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 710 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting 
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004)); Madden v. Myers, 102 
F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).   
“[M]atters of docket control” are left to the sound discretion of the district court. 
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).  Nevertheless, 
mandamus may be warranted where a district court’s delay “is tantamount to a failure to 
exercise jurisdiction.”   Madden, 102 F.3d at 79 (concluding that a months-long delay in 
                                              
1
 To the extent Stubbs also claims that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate 
his habeas petition, such claim is clearly without merit.  “The plain language of the 
habeas statute … confirms the general rule that for core habeas petitions challenging 
present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of 
confinement.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).  
Thus, jurisdiction over Stubbs’ habeas petition properly lies in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania. 
2
 Although Stubbs’ specific prayer for relief requests a writ of prohibition, it could be 
more accurately classified as a writ of mandamus, because he asks us to mandate District 
Court action.  Nevertheless, the form of his request does not affect the relief requested.  
In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1310, 1313 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting the historical 
distinction between writs of mandamus and prohibition, but concluding that the “form [of 
request] is less important than the substantive question of whether an extraordinary 
remedy is available”).   
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disposing of petitioner’s underlying habeas petition was a matter of concern but denying 
mandamus relief without prejudice to petitioner’s right to again seek relief if delay should 
extend beyond one year). 
Subsequent to Stubbs’ petition for writ of prohibition, on September 18, 2012, the 
District Court issued a comprehensive memorandum and order, granting Stubbs de novo 
review regarding one of his habeas claims and denying his petition in all other respects.
3
  
The District Court also directed the respondents to expand the record by filing the 
complete trial transcript on or before October 15, 2012, and it directed all parties to fully 
brief the merits of Stubbs’ claim on or before November 1, 2012.  Thus, the District 
Court has advanced the final resolution of Stubbs’ habeas petition, and we are confident 
it will promptly issue a final order at the conclusion of its de novo review.  Under these 
circumstances, we decline to find that the District Court has failed to exercise its 
jurisdiction.  Kerr, 426 U.S. at 402; Madden, 102 F.3d at 79. 
For these reasons, we will deny Stubbs’ petition.  Regarding those claims denied 
by the District Court, we will deny his petition as moot.  As for the remaining claim, our 
denial is without prejudice to his filing another petition should the District Court not take 
action in a timely manner. 
                                              
3
 The District Court granted de novo review of Stubbs’ claim that counsel was ineffective 
for failing to introduce certain scientific evidence helpful to Stubbs’ defense. 
